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ABSTRACT 
When Uprisings Aren’t Spontaneous: 
The Wisconsin Uprising as a product of movements in struggle 
by 
Ben Manski 
 
The Wisconsin Uprising not only was the early riser of the U.S. protest wave of 
2011, it was highly militant and the largest and most broadly based of those 
mobilizations. Nonetheless, the full meaning of Wisconsin continues to be lost to 
scholars and activists alike. The Wisconsin Uprising provides a classic case for 
studying the process and consequences of movement building, and stands for the 
proposition that the conscious movement building activities of activists matter. I 
draw on interviews and archival research as well as my personal history as a 
protagonist in the popular movements of Wisconsin over 25 years. I show how key 
elements of the Wisconsin Uprising were constructed in the greater period of 
struggle that began in the early 1990s, arguing that the wave of 2011 was a product 
of purposive actions in the course of that struggle. In so doing, I introduce a 
theoretical framework for explaining the trajectories and outcomes of “movements in 
struggle” and takes lessons for future social movement action. 
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I. Introduction 
On May 1, 1995, one thousand “socialist dinosaurs” marched from 
Wisconsin’s Capitol Square to the headquarters of Wisconsin Manufacturers and 
Commerce four blocks away. By the time the May Day Mobilization for a People’s 
Budget had ended, the corporate lobby group’s sign had burned to ashes and 
blackened stone. In the next day’s Wisconsin State Journal, Republican state legislator 
Scott Jensen described the May Day state budget protest as the work of “socialist 
dinosaurs” who had reemerged, as if from Jurassic Park, in the streets of Madison.   
Sixteen years later, on Valentine’s Day, February 14th 2011, eleven hundred 
students and teachers from the University of Wisconsin and Madison Area 
Technical College entered Wisconsin’s Capitol in protest of a proposed state budget 
and so-called “Budget Repair Bill.” By the next evening, upwards of ten thousand 
people had joined the protest and begun occupying the Capitol Building. Within 
days the crowds on the Capitol Square swelled to 30,000, and then 50,000, and 
eventually 150,000, giving global visibility to the six-month period of mass sit-ins, 
political strikes, encampments, assemblies, recall elections, marches and rallies 
known today as the Wisconsin Uprising.  
The Wisconsin Uprising shocked most outside observers. Its scale, tactical 
militancy, and radical working class politics were unexpected. The best that most 
journalists could do to explain Wisconsin was to point lamely to the emerging 
revolutions of the Arab Spring. Multiple subsequent commenters even described 
Wisconsin as inspired by Occupy Wall Street, a manipulation of chronology and 
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causality that would make any time traveler’s head spin. But the Uprising didn’t 
surprise those who first rose up. Many saw it coming, prepared the way for it, and 
built the kind of movement they believed they would need in an ongoing struggle 
against austerity and corporatization. The Wisconsin Uprising provides a classic 
case study for looking at the process and consequences of movement building, and 
stands for the proposition that the conscious movement building activities of 
activists and organizers matter.  
With this study we first ask what it means that Wisconsin surprised most 
scholars of social movements, and what it means that the Uprising has still not been 
explained adequately. I then begin to explain the Uprising by placing Wisconsin’s 
role in the 2011 protest wave within the context of a period of struggle that began in 
the early 1990s. We will see that between the May Day Mobilization for a People’s 
Budget of 1995 and the 2011 Wisconsin Uprising against the Budget Repair Bill, 
movement intellectuals engaged in movement building, a self-conscious activist 
process of constructing the kind of movement they believed was required for the 
current period of struggle. We will see how this conscious movement building 
process produced the people, culture, continuity structures, and resources that 
made the Wisconsin Uprising much of what it was and wasn’t. In so doing, I will 
introduce a theoretical framework for explaining the trajectories and outcomes of 
movements in struggle. And I will take a lesson from Wisconsin for future social 
movement action in this current period of struggle. 
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A. Wisconsin’s relevance for social movement studies 
For a time, in the months before Occupy Wall Street, the mass uprisings of 
the industrial Midwest held the world’s attention. Millions of people tuned in 
regularly just to get the latest news from Wisconsin. Thousands travelled to 
Madison from New York, Washington D.C., Montreal and many other major cities 
to take inspiration and lessons home from the protests. Publishers contracted for a 
series of books geared toward popular audiences, including It Started in Wisconsin 
(Buhle and Buhle 2011), Uprising: How Wisconsin Renewed the Politics of Protest, from 
Madison to Wall Street (Nichols 2012), Wisconsin Uprising: Labor Fights Back (Yates 
2012), We Are Wisconsin (Sagran 2011), The Battle for Wisconsin (Kersten 2011), and 
various commercial films soon followed. Yet very little academic scholarship has 
been produced about Wisconsin. Why?  
One explanation might involve the bicoastal bias of those who view the 
Midwest as “flyover territory.” Another might suggest that the global breadth of 
the protest wave of 2011 was so significant that Wisconsin simply got lost in the 
wider maelstrom. Yet Wisconsin was at least as militant, more clear in its demands, 
significantly larger, and more broadly based than Occupy Wall Street. And as the 
early riser of the 2011 protest wave in the United States, it was novel. Researchers 
should have been interested in learning the lessons of Wisconsin. 
In 2012, in his outgoing remarks as chair of the American Sociological 
Association’s Collective Behavior and Social Movements section, Jeff Goodwin 
pointed to the Wisconsin Uprising and asked those gathered, “where did capitalism 
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go?” by which he meant, ‘where did capitalism go in social movement studies?’ 
Goodwin continued: 
 
   “Too much of the recent scholarship…treats movements as if they were 
hermetically sealed off from broader historical processes and social forces… 
neglect[ing] the broader sweep of politics, but it is capitalism that is especially 
conspicuous for its absence in the recent literature…" (Smirnova and Wooten 
2012) 
 
At that same meeting, Juhi Tyagi and Michael Schwartz reviewed recently 
published articles from the social movements journal Mobilization, finding only 
three that dealt significantly with the contextual “broader sweep” identified by 
Goodwin. The ongoing absence of capitalism may help to explain the relative 
absence of Wisconsin from the dominant social movements literature, and in turn 
brings gravity to what Richard Flacks has called The Question of Relevance in Social 
Movement Studies (Flacks 2005, Bevington and Dixon 2005, Buechler 2000, Goodwin 
and Jasper 1999). Class-based popular movements having been “parceled out” to 
labor studies and industrial relations, the field of social movement studies has 
proven unable to account for some of the most significant social movement activity 
of our time (Barker et alia 2014).  
What would account for Wisconsin? A handful of social movement scholars 
have considered the protests as a case study in collective identity, framing, and 
mobilization, focusing on the escalation of moral obligation through the course of 
the first months of the Uprising (Kearney 2013), the role of place and culture in 
explaining higher mobilization in Wisconsin than in other Midwestern protest 
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states (Klainot 2013), the activation of a “state patriotism” (Anker-Møller 2012), the 
sedimentation of imagery in populist placemaking (Seifert 2013), the translation of 
women’s leadership in the protests into the election of Tammy Baldwin to the U.S. 
Senate (Buhle 2013), the framing of the Uprising as a pro-democracy struggle 
(Goldberg 2011), and the role of Wisconsin as an early riser of the 2011 protest wave 
(Febres-Cordero 2012). Yet worthwhile as some of these forays are, they come to us 
in the form of graduate theses or of short discursive essays. Among the leaders in 
the field of social movement studies, only Jane Collins gives the Wisconsin Uprising 
significant treatment: 
 
   “Studying the Wisconsin protests through the lens of recent writing on 
primitive accumulation suggests the importance of recognizing that resistance to 
accumulation by dispossession is an ongoing aspect of labor’s struggles. This 
recognition implies the need for unity between groups targeting labor rights and 
those concerned more broadly with securing resources for social reproduction.” 
(Collins 2012, p18) 
 
Collins’ analysis provides a starting point for considering Wisconsin within 
the context of a global struggle sometimes described as originating in the 1970s, and 
becoming manifest in the 1990s (Robinson 2008 and 2014, Buechler 2000, Wallis 
1991, Arrighi et alia 1989, Boggs 1986). Throughout the 1990s, the politics of 
austerity, structural adjustment, and corporatization not only generated significant 
resistance of the kind symbolized by 1999’s Battle in Seattle against the World Trade 
Organization. They also spurred the recognition of the need to reinvent the labor 
movement, radical politics, and popular movements in general (Manski 2014 and 
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2015, Juris and Khasnabish 2013, Markoff 1999, Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1998, 
Flacks 1996, Grossman and Adams 1993) and the construction of transnational 
social movement networks (Smith 2008, Welton and Wolf 2001, Buechler 2000, 
McAdam and Rucht 1993, Grunder Frank et alia 1990).  
It would be difficult to explain the Wisconsin Uprising independent of this 
history, and it would be hard to do so using the existing social movement theory 
toolbox. Indeed, few social movement scholars have ever tried. Yet these difficulties 
may be remedied in two steps. First, we can understand that protest waves and waves 
of contention take place within what Rosa Luxemburg called periods of struggle 
(Luxemburg 2008). Second, we can bring together the existing literature on social 
movement continuity, culture, resources, leadership and praxis in constructing an 
understanding of the conscious, activist process of movement building.  
 
B. Wisconsin as a Case Study 
By examining social interactions in their real-world contexts we gain deeper 
understanding of real-world behavior and its meaning (Charmaz 2008, Yin 1994). In 
developing theory out of qualitative “research that honors an inductive style, a 
focus on individual meaning, and the importance of rendering the complexity of a 
situation” (Creswell 2014), I bring a depth of understanding to analysis of the 
Wisconsin Uprising that is missing in most other accounts. Robert Yin suggests six 
sources of evidence for data collection in the case study protocol: documentation, 
archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and 
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physical artifacts. Not all need be used in every case study, but my research makes 
use of most of these in triangulating for data validity.  
My research is grounded in participant observation and conscious praxis in 
the course of my own personal experience as a labor, environmental, student, and 
pro-democracy activist in Wisconsin from 1986 through 2013 (Perlman 2011, Buhle 
and Buhle 2011). I conducted seven semi-structured interviews, seeking the 
understandings of activists from multiple social positions and different activist 
sectors were involved in both the Wisconsin Uprising and in the decades of 
organizing in Wisconsin prior. Given that most activists are public figures who are 
not well compensated for their labors, and based on my own experiences as an 
informant for scores of academic research project, I believe it unethical to for 
researchers to make use of the intellectual labors of activists without giving due 
credit. For this reason, and because my informants preferred their assessments to be 
made public, I have at their direction identified them by name. My semi-structured 
interviews were supplemented with coded analysis of documents, artifacts, and the 
records from the Wisconsin Labor History Society, Madison Infoshop, Democracy 
Teach-In Clearinghouse, Wisconsin Wave, Wisconsin Uprising Archive, and many 
news and editorial sources, as well as a review of the existing social scientific 
literature on the Wisconsin Uprising.  
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II. The Social Movement and Social Change Literature 
A. Waves of contention within periods of struggle 
Social movements are, by definition, inconstant. They tend to rise and fall. 
For this reason, when social movements swell, they are described in terms of waves 
or cycles. The concept of waves of contention, or protest waves, is generally useful 
in understanding the trajectories of social movement action, and there is a 
significant body of research that has been constructed around the emergence of 
protest waves, their resolution and subsidence, and the cultural, political, and social 
structural artifacts they produce. (Koopmans 2007, McAdam et alia 2003, Tarrow 
1998, Meyer and Staggenborg 1996, Snow and Benford 1992). 
Unclear, however, is the temporal duration of such waves.  When speaking 
of a wave of contention, is our object to be found in the months or years of 
heightened visibility, or are such waves generally of greater duration, and inclusive 
of the many years of less intensive activity that precede the surfacing of a social 
movement? Were the years 1968-1973 the period of a protest wave, or is it more 
useful to think of that wave as having started earlier and ended later? Similarly, is it 
useful to speak of the “Protest Wave of 2011,” as many scholars have, or will we 
later look back to 2009 as the first year of a protest wave that continued on past 
2011?  
A few have taken stabs at clarifying what defines the temporal limits of a 
wave or cycle of contention; Sidney Tarrow made a passing reference to a typology 
of “moments, cycles, ages of contention” (Tarrow 1993, p21). A dominant discourse 
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within social movement theory has described waves of contention as occurring in 
response to perceived threats and according to the relative structure of political 
opportunity available to activists at a particular time (McAdam et alia 2001). 
Analyses of opportunity and threats are presented as useful in predicting when 
contention will escalate (Tarrow 2011). Yet, as Taylor (1989) has noted, missing from 
such analyses are useful explanations of what meaningful activity occurs between 
waves of contention and of the role of activists in building social movements in 
periods of less visibility. Thus, missing in most accounts, is an effective means of 
predicting what activists will do in the course of contention. 
  
“It is absurd to think of the mass strike as one act, one isolated action. The mass 
strike is rather the indication, the rallying idea, of a whole period of class struggle 
lasting for years, perhaps decades.” (Luxemburg 2008, p141) 
 
Waves of contention – what Rosa Luxemburg a century ago described as 
mass strikes – are usually of shorter duration than the lifespans of the people who 
make them. Many activists live through multiple waves of contention, immersed all 
the while in “the great underground work of the revolution [which is] in reality 
being carried on without cessation, day by day and hour by hour, in the very heart 
of the empire.” (Ibid, p133).  
This underground work – which activists today call “movement building” – 
is not only uninterrupted, it is of duration, carried on not only hour-by-hour but 
also year-by-year and sometimes decade-by-decade. The work takes place within 
the context of a period defined by a long-lasting crisis in which, "the political forces 
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which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself,” engage in 
an “incessant and persistent” struggle against movements from below (Gramsci 
2000, p201). Antonio Gramsci called such periods conjunctural. For our purposes 
here I instead use Luxemburg’s periods of struggle, situating waves of contention 
within periods of struggle. 
The 2011 protest wave, of which the Wisconsin Uprising was a critical 
element, can only be properly understood in the context of a period of struggle that 
began in the early 1990s and continues today. Francis Fukuyama predicted in 1989 
that the collapse of the Soviet Bloc would bring with it the end of social systemic 
change, and therefore, of history (Fukuyama 1989). Instead, the Soviet collapse at 
once ended a period of international struggle defined by superpower hegemony 
and at the same time initiated a new period of global struggle between corporate 
capital and people’s movements (Robinson 2014, Buechler 2000, Wallis 1991, Núñez 
Soto and Gillooly 1989). From Washington, Wall Street, and Dallas, as well as 
London, Davos, and Doha, came a multipronged and multilevel push that included 
neoliberal trade policies like NAFTA and the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investments, domestic corporatization policies like the telecommunications and 
welfare reform acts of 1996, and everywhere, resource wars for oil and minerals 
(Manski 2015). The resistance to these policies took on greater coherence and 
militancy as the global struggle developed, producing massive movement upsurges 
in the protest waves symbolized by the Battle in Seattle of 1999, the global anti-war 
protests of 2003, and the Day Without an Immigrant of May Day, 2006. 
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Wisconsinites who were veterans of these struggles, as well as of localized conflicts 
over corporatization, austerity and democracy, introduced the protest wave of 2011 
to the United States. 
 
B. In Struggle: The movement building process 
Ask most any veteran activist and they will react with surprise on hearing 
that the concept of movement building is not already a central part of the sociological 
literature on social movements. After all, movement building is nothing more than 
the critical work the movement intellectuals Richard Healey and Sandra Hinson 
were celebrating in, “point[ing] to promising trends – greater attention to political 
education, leadership development, coalition building, and infrastructure – that we 
see manifest in renewed efforts to become more strategic." (Healey and Hinson 
2005, p57-58). 
Activists engage in movement building all the time. Social movements are 
filled with institutions and practices devoted to the task, from movement half-way 
houses such as the Highlander Center to pedagogical campaigns such as teach-ins 
and micro practices such as skill-shares. In recent years, passing references to 
movement building have increasingly appeared in academic journals and graduate 
theses. And some scholars have called attention to the importance of movement 
building (Avendaño and Hiatt 2012, Kay 2011, Ryan and Gamson 2006). Yet to date, 
with one notable exception which we’ll turn to later, the practice of movement 
building has not been brought in from the field to the academy as a theoretical 
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concept. Here again is an opportunity for academic scholarship to gain from the 
learning of lay practitioners (Bevington and Dixon 2005). 
To be clear, many of what I identify as the elements of movement building 
have already been analyzed within the field of social movement studies. These 
include questions of movement organization, continuity, culture, resources, and 
leadership. What has generally been missing is the recognition that all of these 
together are produced, reproduced, and synthesized through the conscious action 
of activists in a movement building process oriented toward long-term strategic 
gains in the course of social struggle. Movement building is a material praxis. 
Social movement scholars recognize that movements don’t always disappear 
in times of less visible activity between waves of contention. Movement continuity is 
a common fact. Verta Taylor and Leila Rupp explored the role of structures of 
abeyance – institutions, organizations, networks, and communities – in retaining 
critical ideological and other cultural resources through relatively low periods of 
mobilization (Taylor 1989, Rupp and Taylor 1987). More recent research has 
identified the importance of informal place-based movement scenes as abeyance 
structures (Haunss and Leach 2007). And a wide variety of scholars have 
considered the role of collective identity in maintaining submerged networks of 
activists through periods of lesser activity (Melucci 1996), building collective 
consciousness and solidarity (Hunt and Benford 2007, Taylor and Whittier and 
1992), and shaping the long-term strategic orientations of movement participants 
(Fominaya 2010, Polletta and Jasper 2001). 
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A closely related body of work is concerned with the importance of movement 
culture both as a product and a producer of social movements. Waves of contention 
often produce cultural currents which in turn can rebound to impact the very 
movements that helped produce them as well as other social movements (Earl 2007, 
Whittier 2007, Taylor and Whittier 1995). In particular, the cultural frames articulated 
and elaborated by social movement participants have been shown to produce wider 
cultural change (Snow et alia 2013). Significant attention has also been paid by social 
movement scholars to the construction and distribution of cultural bundles of 
tactics, symbols, and practices described as collective action repertoires or toolkits 
(Taylor 2009 and 1996, Swidley 1986, Tilly 1977) and charismatic packages 
(Lowenhaupt Tsing 2005) which become available for future use or which may 
spillover and diffuse across into other movements (Whittier 2007, Soule 2007).  
A few researchers have looked beyond these mostly discrete set of cultural 
artifacts to examine the ways in which culture can become embedded in institutions 
as roadmaps, or institutional schemas for action (Polletta 2008). And still others have 
developed the analytical framework of political cultures of opposition and resistance. 
There, ideology and cultural idioms are understood to mediate between 
individual’s subjective experiences and the objective structural and organizational 
forces they face (Foran 2014, Reed and Foran 2002, Taylor 2002, Morris and Braine 
2001). Such political cultures have been found to be especially important in 
maintaining the kind of horizontalist, decentralized, and anti-authoritarian 
movements that have arisen since the 1990s (Leach 2013). Indeed, it is these very 
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kinds of movements and community-based uprisings that have most often been 
described as “spontaneous” or encouraging spontaneity in the social movement 
literature (Kucinskas 2015, Snow and Moss 2014).  
Movement know-how is transmitted in symbols and other forms of material 
culture, yet the accumulation of knowledge and experience within individuals also 
is critical to movement success. Movement leaders play key roles in sustaining 
movements (Taylor 1994) and in creating opportunities for movement success 
(Morris and Staggenborg 2007). Gramsci recognized the importance of organic 
intellectuals, who, having arisen out of conditions of social struggle, provide 
movement leadership at the ground level (Gramsci 2000). More recent scholarship 
in this tradition calls them movement intellectuals or simply activists (Barker et alia 
2014, Cox and Gunvald Nilsen 2014, Eyerman and Jamison 1991). And activist 
biographies reveal that once activated, individuals tend to remain engaged in social 
change work (McAdam 1989, Whalen and Flacks 1980). We find a most useful 
account of the generation of such grassroots leadership in returning to Luxemburg 
and The Mass Strike: 
  
    “The most precious, because lasting, thing in this rapid ebb and flow of the 
wave is its mental sediment: the intellectual, cultural growth of the proletariat, 
which proceeds by fits and starts, and which offers an inviolable guarantee of their 
further irresistible progress in the economic as in the political struggle.” 
(Luxemburg 2008, p134, emphasis added) 
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Leaders aren’t effective unless they are able to access and mobilize resources. 
For many years, the study of social movements was dominated by a resource 
mobilization model that emphasized the importance of the accumulation of material, 
organizational, moral, and human resources (Zald 1992, McCarthy and Zald 1977).  
The effective and innovative use of resources, or resourcefulness, has been 
recognized as a resource in its own right – a kind of strategic capacity of 
organizations identified by Marshall Ganz in his study of the United Farm Workers 
(Ganz 2000). Activists know the importance of organizations in developing 
leadership (Han 2014) and in building resource capacity. Since the 1990s the U.S. 
labor movement in particular has been engaged in significant internal debates over 
the need massively to expand its organizing program and its social base (Fletcher 
and Gapasin 2008, Moody 2007, Lichtenstein 2002, Bernard 2008, Bronfenbrenner 
1999).   
Beyond the ranks of organized labor, efforts to build popular movements in 
the United States have engaged in what Jeffrey Juris and six coauthors have called 
the construction of movement building machines (Juris et alia 2014). Their analysis of 
the U.S. Social Forum process of 2010 represents an important effort to 
conceptualize movement building within a social movement studies framework. 
They describe the Social Forum process as a machine producing new organizational 
resources: cross-sectoral alliances, organizational infrastructure, and links between 
local, regional, national, and global struggles.   
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Social movement scholars aren’t the only ones who know that movement 
continuity, culture, leadership, and resource mobilization are critical elements in 
the building of social movements. For activists engaged in struggle, these elements 
often are not just the building blocks of movements, but the elements of life itself, 
determining whether or not essential needs are met and modulating the degree of 
risk and exposure to personal harm the activist experiences. Struggles, after all, 
involve more than one participant; social movements from below engaged with 
social movements from above (Cox and Gunvald Nilsen 2014). Thus, as Colin Barker 
tells us: 
 
    “‘Class struggle’ is inherently a process involving (at least) two sides. One 
side involves multifarious forms of resistance to exploitation and oppression; the 
other includes the equally varied means by which ruling groups work to maintain 
their positions and to contain such resistance.” (Barker 2014: 43). 
 
Struggle occurs in geographic locations, upon conditions, and within a set of 
social relations particular to the actors involved, or what Gramsci termed terrains of 
struggle (Gramsci 2000). In the course of struggle, activists teach themselves and 
others lessons about how to build lasting, effective, well-resourced movements for 
the road ahead, and it matters to activists whether those lessons prove correct 
(Pleyers 2013, Wainwright 1994). If they are correct, activist efforts escalate over 
time from particularized local conflicts to generalized campaigns to large scale and 
potentially revolutionary social movement projects (Cox and Gunvald Nilsen). This 
reflexive building process is essential to the larger social change process that Ron 
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Eyerman and Andrew Jamison named cognitive praxis (1991) and Richard Flacks 
called making history (1988). If, as Colin Barker has put it, social “movements are 
mediated expressions of class struggle” (2014), activists and their antagonists are the 
prime mediators.  
I stress this last point because I know it will somehow be missed by some. 
The building of social movements is never unilateral and it does not occur in a 
vacuum. Most activists engage in movement building conscious of their immediate 
antagonists and other actors, as well as with some sense of the need for, as 
Wisconsin family farm activist John Peck put it, “strategies and analysis that carry 
through beyond your immediate crisis or battle or target that you are focused on, 
and that is more broad based" (2016). Just as struggle is both interactive (between 
movement actors and others) and intra-active (among movement actors), so too is 
the process of movement building. Thus, even processes that might seem purely 
internal to particular movements, such as trainings, skill shares, caucuses, or 
conferences are undertaken in knowledge of struggle. And “sporadic outbreaks and 
skirmishes” that might seem external to the process of movement building are in 
actuality “giving the people a lesson” (Lenin 1903) through which “all the elements 
necessary for a coming battle unite and develop" (Marx 1847).  
I define the movement building process as the purposive production of social 
movement elements for use in future struggle. The process is purposive in that it involves 
the conscious and often praxis-driven action of movement participants toward a 
future goal. The process produces social movement elements to the extent that it 
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builds continuity structures, culture, leaders and resource capacity. And the process 
occurs within the context and consciousness of present and future social struggle.   
 
III. Findings and Analysis 
A. Wisconsin in Struggle 
 
    “Revolutions must be prepared for gradually, outrages must be resisted, and 
outrageous laws must be resisted and refused obedience to, before a revolution can be 
prepared for, long before it can be matured.”  
~ The Racine Advocate, 1851, a newspaper of Wisconsin’s abolitionist movement 
 
Beginning with statehood in 1848, Wisconsin provided a heartland for 
radical, socialist, and progressive politics. The state resisted slavery to the point that 
prior to election of Lincoln to the presidency, the legislature began secession 
proceedings and Governor Randall ordered a review of state militia units to insure 
loyalty to Wisconsin in the case of war with the federal government (Manski 2006). 
Fifty years later, the Socialist and Progressive parties dominated municipal and 
state politics for most of a generation. In the 1960s and 1970s, Madison in particular 
was a global center of the New Left. Major national organizations and unions like 
the National Organization for Women, United States Student Association, Sierra 
Club, AFSCME, and National Education Association were formed and led by 
Wisconsinites. In the 1980s, Wisconsin became a hub of Latin American solidarity 
organizations, the U.S. Out of Apartheid movement, and anti-nuclear organizing. 
By the early 1990s, Wisconsin was home to an internationally-oriented, dense 
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network of progressive non-profit organizations, universities, labor unions, and 
politically engaged worker, service, and housing cooperatives. All of this made 
Wisconsin what Ralph Nader once called “The Progressive Heritage State,” a place 
where, as my research reinforced, every school child is raised on stories of the La 
Follette insurgencies, sewer socialism, farm and labor strikes, and Wisconsin’s clean 
government and clean environment traditions.  
It also made Wisconsin a national target of the political right long before the 
surname “Koch” came to prominence. The election of Tommy Thompson as 
governor in 1986 initiated a period of political struggle that heightened and 
expanded into economic and social struggle on a series of fronts by the mid-1990s 
and which involved a concerted effort by national rightwing groups like the 
Alliance Defense Fund, National Association of Scholars, and the Bradley 
Foundation, among others, to restructure Wisconsin’s political economy and to 
contest the cultural hegemony of Wisconsin progressivism.  
Here I do not intend to present a chronology or a history of these struggles. 
Certainly a history is needed, both of the 1990s-2010s period and also of the 
Wisconsin Uprising itself (with few exceptions the written and video works 
published in 2011-2012 were either preliminary at best or one-dimensional and 
factually flawed at worst). Instead, here I analyze the iterative movement building 
process leading up to the Wisconsin Uprising, recognizing that activists in the 
Wisconsin struggle produced and reproduced key elements of a movement that 
shook the world in early 2011.  
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I begin by identifying four important terrains of struggle: First, the state’s 
biennual budget battles; second, sectoral and institutional conflicts over 
corporatization and corporate power; third, the participation of Wisconsinites in 
regional, national, and global conflicts against corporations and the state; fourth, 
conflicts over the fate of social movement organizations and institutions in 
Wisconsin.  
In presenting each terrain of struggle, I identify important conflicts that took 
place in Wisconsin over this period. These conflicts were often of significant 
duration and involved thousands and tens of thousands of people, yet they each 
were only particular fronts in larger waves of contention and in the overall period 
of struggle. One might think of these conflicts as similar to what are sometimes 
called episodes of contention (McAdam et alia 2003), yet I don’t find the term 
‘episodes’ particularly intuitive for events and processes of this scale. The overall 
framework I am using here might be represented simply as:  
periods of struggle > waves of contention > conflicts 
I don’t attempt to provide a complete history of the Wisconsin left, and some 
critical conflicts in which I and many of those I interviewed were involved (for 
instance, anti-war activism and the marriage equality movement) are not dealt with 
here. I focus on those terrains and conflicts that most directly prefigured the 
Wisconsin Uprising of 2011. 
Finally, I identify certain elements essential to movement continuity and 
cultural, leadership, and resource development that were produced by activists in 
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these struggles and which proved important in the manifestation of the Wisconsin 
Uprising. Some might think of these elements as similar to what social movement 
scholars sometimes call spillover (Whittier 2007, Soule 2007). Yet most of these 
elements did not simply happen to spill from one conflict to another. They were 
consciously constructed and carried forward in individuals, artifacts, and 
organizations. Many of the activists involved in these conflicts were fully conscious 
of the reality that they were engaged in a longer and broader struggle and that the 
choices they made and strategies they pursued in the course of that struggle would 
produce the social movements of the future.  
 
1. Terrain of Struggle: State Budgets. The State of Wisconsin runs its budgets 
on a two year cycle. This means that every two years, in the beginning of January, 
the governor makes a speech about state priorities and proposes a draft of the next 
state budget. Over the course of the next five months, interest groups mobilize their 
members to influence legislators over particular budget priorities. Into the early 
1990s, there were a number of major budget protests organized by labor unions, 
student associations, and others. Yet, these were usually single-constituency 
mobilizations and not even sectoral in scope; the teachers mobilized teachers, 
students mobilized students, health care advocates mobilized physicians and 
nurses, and so on. In 1993, Gov. Thompson was successful in using the budget 
process to impose school district revenue caps and limits on teacher pay increases.   
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In 1995, the pattern of single-constituency budget protests changed. The May 
Day Mobilization for a People’s Budget was organized in response to a proposed 
budget by Gov. Thompson which was a harbinger in many respects Gov. Walker’s 
Act 10 Budget Repair Bill of 2011. The 1995 Thompson budget hit many social 
sectors with fiscal cuts at once, gutted environmental oversight, exposed state 
employees to greater risk, attempted to eviscerate the office of Secretary of State 
Doug La Follette, and more. In response, a joint effort by the Madison branch of the 
Industrial Workers of the World and the Wisconsin Greens, with critical support 
from Madison Teachers Inc (MTI), was successful in building a labor, student, 
community and environmental coalition of 105 organizations, including major 
statewide formations such as the Wisconsin AFL-CIO, John Muir Chapter of the 
Sierra Club, Wisconsin NOW, and United Council of UW Students.  
Weeks of protest leading up to May 1st culminated in a mass rally at the 
Capitol, an all-day “People’s Budget Hearing” in which an alternative budget was 
drawn up, and the fateful march on Wisconsin Manufacturer’s and Commerce 
(WMC), the state affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National 
Association of Manufacturers. A giant puppet representing Gov. Thompson as an 
octopus strangling various institutions of Wisconsin’s progressive tradition was set 
on fire. And the WMC’s sign, on which the puppet was leaning, exploded into 
flames and burned to ashes. Republicans were apoplectic. Democrats were 
apologetic. And activists – after ensuring that the fire had been put out – headed to 
the nearest beer hall and prepared for another round. 
  - 23 - 
“This was very important because, growing out of that May Day budget 
protest and for all the years since, has been the Earth Day to May Day Coalition,” a 
process involving mainstream unions, environmental groups, and community 
organizations in building personal, cultural and organizational ties across the green 
and blue spectrums (Stockwell 2016).  It also inaugurated a regular practice of 
coalition work around each state budget cycle, including mass protests during the 
tenure of Governor Jim Doyle, a Democrat, against his proposed anti-labor austerity 
budget of 2005.  
Each of these budget conflicts formed "building blocks coming up to 2011," 
as MTI teachers union official John Matthews described them (2016). In these 
budget conflicts activists developed a movement repertoire that included cultural 
elements such as the practice of targeting the state chamber of commerce as a 
common “class enemy,” statewide coalition work around state budget processes, 
the strengthening of ties between environmental and labor organizations in 
particular, the identification of mainstream social movement organizations with the 
radical heritage of May Day and the May Day sing-along tradition. Furthermore, 
the creation of the standing coalition around Earth Day and May Day fostered 
movement continuity and as well the emerging movement’s resource capacity through 
strengthened social network ties among key movement leaders. “In Madison, the 
good news about us by 2011 was that all of those very close, inclusive relationships 
were there,” according to union staffer Ed Sadlowski, Jr. (2016).  
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2. Terrain of Struggle: Sectoral corporatization. After 20 years of deployment 
in the Global South, in the 1990s the Washington Consensus’ program structural 
adjustment was brought north (Manski and Peck 2006). In 1994, Michael Joyce, 
president of the Milwaukee-based Bradley Foundation, called for the abolition of 
the idea most identified with the state of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Idea. In an 
article titled The Legacy of the ‘Wisconsin Idea’ Hastening the Demise of an Exhausted 
Progressivism, Joyce wrote that because “the public school [has] become virtually 
synonymous with progressive democracy,” rightwing activists were “looking even 
now for promising states upon which to focus their initial efforts – states that have 
traditions of progressive, citizen-based politics; states where parents are refusing to 
turn over more funds to failures like the public-education establishment; states 
where parents are clamoring instead for the opportunity to select their own schools 
for their children. You may be sure that Wisconsin fits that bill nicely.”  (Joyce 1994, 
p.11-14). In actuality, the Wisconsin Idea – “the boundaries of the university are the 
boundaries of the state” – is specifically associated with the 26-campus University 
of Wisconsin System more so than with its K-12 public schools, but Joyce’s 
broadside against both the universities and the schools of Wisconsin was if 
anything, an understatement of the Bradley Foundation’s agenda.  
Governor Thompson of Wisconsin proved a quite willing instrument for 
implementing a radical restructuring of Wisconsin’s public education, corrections, 
and welfare systems, as well as of the state’s regulatory approach to natural 
resources and business. Majority minority Milwaukee in particular was made the 
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primary national testing ground for all kinds of corporatization schemes, including 
Workfare, Bridefare, School to Work, education vouchers, charter schools, private 
prisons, and more. To the chagrin of many Wisconsinites, Thompson’s 
corporatization program became known worldwide in policy circles as “The 
Wisconsin Model” (Reese 2011). Meanwhile, the Exxon Minerals corporation 
pursued plan to open the world’s largest metallic sulfide mine at the headwaters of 
the Wolf River and immediately abutting the Mole Lake Sokaogon Anishinabe 
(Chippewa) reservation. Governor Thompson’s top aide, James Klauser, was a 
former Exxon lobbyist. 
A popular meme of radical movements in the 1990s was a modified image of 
a road sign that read, “Resistance May Be Expected.” As the Thompson 
administration “just kept chipping away at the Wisconsin tradition,” resistance 
mounted (Matthews 2016). 
Wisconsin’s anti-mining movement united rural and urban people, tribal 
communities and the rural white working class. Tribal activists blocked railroad 
tracks and fought mining at the DNR and in the courts. The AFL-CIO came out 
against metallic sulfide mining. Marches of thousands against the proposed mine 
took place in small towns and in larger cities. The Earth First! movement held its 
annual gathering in the North Woods, occupying the mine site and corporate 
offices. Municipalities across the state passed anti-mining resolutions and North 
Woods townships attempted to ban mining in their jurisdictions. 60,000 people 
signed a petition calling for the revocation of Exxon’s certificate to do business in 
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Wisconsin. A popular slogan of the movement was “Wisconsin Forever! Exxon 
Never!” The resistance to mining in Wisconsin came to be called “The Wisconsin 
Contagion” in mining industry circles, and after a decade of intensive resistance, 
Exxon gave up and the state legislature adopted a moratorium on metallic sulfide 
mining by such a margin that Gov. Thompson felt compelled to sign it into law.  
The multiracial rural-urban alliance in the conflict over extraction involved 
some of the same activists engaged in the many conflicts over the racialized 
corporatization of public services. Southeast Wisconsin’s Welfare Warriors 
organization, made up primarily of white and Black activists, joined with Hmong, 
Latino and other community activists across the state in resisting Thompson’s plans 
for Wisconsin’s welfare programs; Thompson’s W2 program became the model for 
President Clinton’s 1996 welfare act. A Latino-led campaign based in Milwaukee 
called Education for the People joined with local teachers unions and student 
groups in opposing school vouchers, charter schools, and corporate advertising in 
public schools. Majority minority Milwaukee high school students stalled 
Republican plans to disband their school district in favor of a vouchers program by 
organizing white high school students in rural districts to support them, and then 
by heading to Madison where they occupied the Governor’s Office. In Madison, an 
alliance of the Greens and MTI teachers union was successful in forcing the 
resignation of school superintendent Cheryl Wilhoyte (whose next job involved 
running the Edison Project’s corporate takeover of the Philadelphia School System).  
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At the University of Wisconsin System, a concerted campaign was made to 
defend affirmative action from attack by the National Association of Scholars. In the 
course of these multiracial statewide campaigns, activists with the A Job is a Right 
Campaign revealed that the Bradley Foundation was the major source of funding 
behind the corporatization and racialization of welfare and education in Wisconsin 
as well as nationally. Among other things, the Bradley Foundation had financed the 
publication of Charles Murray’s racist tract The Bell Curve, which claimed to prove 
that Blacks were genetically inferior to Whites and Asians. The Bradley Foundation 
now became the target of regular protests by an unusual coalition of activists from 
various labor unions and student groups, the Nation of Islam and Catholic nuns, 
welfare rights activists, Greens and socialists. 
A third site of conflict throughout the 1990s and 2000s was the 26 campus 
University of Wisconsin System, where, as in many other parts of the country, 
funding cuts and tuition increases drove students, faculty, staff and community 
members into standing alliances such as the UW System-wide Alliance for 
Democracy, the Coalition for Social Responsible Investment, and the UW 
Federation of Labor, each of which campaigned for the democratization of the 
University itself. Out of these alliances emerged the national student anti-
sweatshop movement, with the UW-Madison leading the way with mass anti-
Reebok protests in 1995 and then weeklong mass anti-sweatshop sit-ins in early 
1999 and 2000. Most of the initial leadership of United Students Against Sweatshops 
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(USAS) came from UW-Madison’s Student Labor Action Coalition (SLAC) and UW 
Greens.  
Wisconsin was the national headquarters for the anti-corporate campus 
group 180/Movement for Democracy and Education (180/MDE) as well as the 
National Teach-Ins on Corporations, Education, and Democracy, later renamed the 
Democracy Teach-Ins. “The purpose of the Teach-Ins has been to raise such 
questions as, ‘Do we live in a democracy?" and if not, "How can we win 
democracy?" with as many people, particularly young people, as possible” (DTI 
1996, 1997, 1998). The teach-in process also deliberately nationalized Wisconsin’s 
revival of the May Day tradition, securing the formal endorsement in May Day 
activities by scores of major national progressive organizations. In 2001, 1500 
students walked out of classes and occupied the State Capitol Building in a protest 
that secured the first tuition freeze in UW history. In 2003, as part of the global 
Books Not Bombs Student Strike initiated by 180/MDE, over 5000 college, high 
school, and middle school students occupied the Capitol Building. In 2005, 48 
students from across the state organized a five-day hunger strike inside the Capitol 
Building against tuition hikes.  
In the course of each of these and other sectoral conflicts, activists produced 
and reproduced critical cultural elements for movement building including statewide 
multiracial coalition building against a common corporate target (and often on the 
basis of working class solidarity), sophisticated direct action organizing, and 
demands for democratic structural reforms. These critical lessons reinforced what 
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many Wisconsinites knew from childhood, which was that “statewide organizing is 
right out of the progressive playbook; Fighting Bob La Follette took rural farmers 
and urban factory workers and aligned them, and we know and have to show that 
rural families have been left out in the cold and abandoned in same way that urban 
families have been,” as Milwaukee labor organizer Jennifer Epps-Addison told me 
(2016).  
Most of the standing alliances created out of these particular conflicts did not 
last through to 2011, and therefore could not in themselves provide for the building 
of resource capacity or the kind of structures for movement continuity that might have 
been helpful in the Uprising; one notable exception was the Wisconsin Network for 
Peace and Justice. Yet many individual movement leaders from these struggles 
remained active in Wisconsin throughout the entire period, and their personal 
relationships, maintained in abeyance through submerged networks, were to prove 
important in the formation of Wisconsin Wave of 2011. As Milwaukee teacher and 
labor activist Sangita Nayak shared, in referencing a mid-1990s meeting with 
university administrators over recruitment and retention of students of color, “The 
same people at that table were the same people in all of those fights, so being an 
activist at that time you had to know that all these battles were going to come 
together in one grand fight.”  
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3. Terrain of Struggle: Corporate globalization. Wisconsin is 900 miles from 
Washington D.C. and 1800 miles from Washington State, yet distance did not 
prevent Wisconsinites from playing pivotal roles in the 1990s-era wave of 
contention over the shape of globalization. U.S. Senator Feingold was a recognized 
leader the fight against NAFTA, the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) and other trade deals, and in doing so he was in line with the 
many Wisconsin cities and towns that had passed resolutions calling for “Fair 
Trade, not Free Trade.” The international human rights organizations Colombia 
Support Network, Free Burma Coalition, East Timor Action Network, and Students 
for a Free Tibet all made their homes in Madison, and local solidarity activism with 
popular movements in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, and Nigeria was 
particularly strong. In 1999, hundreds Wisconsinites travelled to participate in the 
mass direct action protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle, and in 
the following years hundreds more headed to Washington D.C., Quebec City, 
Miami, and points around the globe for protests against the IMF, World Bank, 
WTO, and FTAA.  
Closer to home, following on the first World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, 
Brazil, some of the first social forum processes in North America were organized as 
the Midwest Social Forums hosted in Wisconsin from 2003 through 2006, ahead of 
the first U.S. Social Forum in 2007. Wisconsinites travelled in large groups to 
support the prolonged labor strikes in the so-called Labor Warzone of Central 
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Illinois, the newspaper strike in Detroit, Mohawk encampments in central Ontario, 
the Minnehaha Free State actions in Minnesota, and mass protests against corporate 
sponsorship of the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1996.  
In 2002, Wisconsin itself became home to a national mobilization against 
corporate influence in the U.S. Conference of Mayors when that organization met in 
Madison; the mayor declared martial law, sealed off much of the downtown against 
protests, and was punished by voters in the following election with a fourth place 
finish. In 2004, hundreds of Wisconsinites traveled to Ohio to assist with the 
oversight of the presidential recount in that state. In 2006, 25,000 marched in 
Madison and 70,000 in Milwaukee in the wave of immigrant workers rights 
mobilizations that swept the country. 
Through each of these conflicts and mobilizations, Wisconsin activists 
expanded their social networks across national and regional borders, strengthening 
their sense of collective identity as a part of a global popular movement, thus 
opening up new network resources for receiving global solidarity, and orienting 
themselves culturally toward an idea that their local troubles and global social 
problems were one and the same:  
 
    “‘An injury to one is an injury to all’ was a slogan that the leadership took to 
heart. So when there was a struggle elsewhere, be that elsewhere in the United States 
or elsewhere internationally, they would open the doors and have people come in and 
talk about that. I think that what that did was it raised the consciousness of the local 
labor movement that labor struggles are not just what’s happening in your shop, it’s 
what’s happening in all the shops around you, all the shops in the country, and in 
fact all the shops in the world.” (Stockwell). 
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4. Terrain of Struggle: Wisconsin’s progressive movement. As addressed in 
our discussion of the sectoral struggles against corporatization, the progressive 
movement in Wisconsin came under a concerted national attack beginning in the 
early 1990s. Some of this national attention was focused on the political economy 
that formed the underlying social base for progressive politics in Wisconsin, and 
some of it was direct, targeting popular movement organizations and institutions 
themselves. At the same time, activists in Wisconsin engaged in both novel and 
conventional movement building activities which resulted in the growth of resource 
mobilization capacity in particular areas.  
Overt anti-union activity was relatively limited in Wisconsin compared to 
other Midwestern states in this period. Defensive strikes and lockouts such as the 
one in 2003-2004 at Tyson Foods’ Jefferson, Wisconsin plant were not unheard of, 
and there were periodic union-busting trial balloons by both private and public 
employers. At the same time, there were some advances in expanding union 
representation in some sectors. University of Wisconsin faculty, for instance, finally 
won a long fight for collective bargaining rights in 2010.  The real blow to union 
capacity in Wisconsin was structural. As neoliberal austerity and global trade 
policies “hit town after town where militant trade unionism was practiced, it 
became clear to us that this wasn’t just about seeking cheaper labor – that was a 
part of it – it was about eradicating any semblance of democracy in the economy” 
(Sadlowski 2016). In Wisconsin as across the country, unions did not replace lost 
manufacturing sector members with service, clerical, and agricultural workers. One 
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result was that Wisconsin’s union representation declined from 19% to 14% of 
employed workers between 2000 and 2011 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
Another was that the leadership of most state unions stayed monochromatic and 
got grayer over time. And a related development was that the state’s largest unions 
adopted less militant postures:  
 
   “They just were not ready. AFSCME and WEAC tried to move away from a 
confrontational aspect of bargaining. They wanted to be known as a professional 
organization, as nice guys, and didn’t want to be confrontational and therefore 
didn’t maintain the ability to be confrontational when they needed to be. They 
wanted to be known as organizations that politicians could get along with. They 
didn’t maintain what they needed to with the legislature or with political action so 
that they were a force.” (Matthews) 
  
Even as much of Wisconsin labor lost members and militancy, other unions and 
labor organizations gained political consciousness. Many of these gains came out of 
the May Day process built around the biennial state budget conflicts and the many 
other anti-corporate conflicts that generated interactive forms of movement 
building. Yet intra-active movement building occurred as well as veteran labor 
activists developed new institutions, traditions, and practices in order to build 
working class consciousness and union power. Madison’s WORT community radio 
station launched regular Labor Radio programming in 1991, and this in time grew 
from a short morning update to a regular weekly program and eventually, a 
nationally syndicated labor radio service called Workers Independent News (WIN). 
May Day celebrations were expanded beyond the annual rally and picnic to include 
an annual May Day Sing-Along, teach-ins, and special events like the Irish Labor 
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Sing-Along. Workers Memorial Day became a major annual event organized by 
central labor councils in various regions of Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Labor History 
Society brought labor education and the epic book, Labor’s Untold Story, to the 
state’s public schools. And the various local independent teachers unions and 
central labor councils made a point of building ongoing, horizontal relationships 
across the various different regions of the state. All of this was the work of a cohort 
of militant labor activists who came to the fore in the 1970s and 1980s, and many of 
whom remained in leadership of Wisconsin labor right through into 2011. 
Like organized labor, student organizations in Wisconsin lost significant 
institutional muscle at the same time that they developed greater independence and 
militancy. The Arizona-based Alliance Defense Fund orchestrated a direct legal 
assault on the ability of student associations to use student fees for advocacy and 
organizing purposes. This litigation specifically targeted student groups such as 
Black Student Union, UW Greens, and Campus Women’s Center at the UW-
Madison, and resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Board of Regents of the UW 
System v. Southworth ruling, which while facially a victory had the practical effect of 
severely limiting student advocacy across the state. Student associations across the 
Wisconsin and the rest of the country responded to Southworth by adopting policies 
requiring “content neutrality” in the allocation of student fees, the practical effect of 
which has been to limit the institutional capacity of students to organize collectively 
and engage in express advocacy. Notably, the loss of institutional power did not 
translate to a decline in student militancy – if anything, the reverse was true. In the 
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late 1990s and early 2000s, students and campus workers repeatedly occupied 
Regents meetings and campus administration buildings, went on strike, engaged in 
prolonged hunger strikes, and in one case, suffered an early morning police raid 
that resulted in 54 arrests. Furthermore, students began to build new institutions 
outside of the official governance structure of the university, “setting up an 
infrastructure to shift power at the school for the long haul” (Epps-Addison 2016). 
Family farm organizations were significantly weakened through this period 
by the corporate consolidation of agriculture in Wisconsin, with three family farms 
failing a day at the height of Wisconsin’s farm crisis. However, in the process of 
their resistance to recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone (rBGH/BST) and milk 
exchange price fixing, radical groups like the Family Farmer Defenders imparted 
new leadership and militancy to the venerable Farmers Union and other farm and 
ag groups.  
In the media sector, Wisconsin activists experienced significant but fleeting 
growth in independent media, with the creation of radio stations, new weekly 
alternative newspapers such as The Wisconsinite, and a robust IndyMedia operation. 
Nearly all of these collapsed by the end of the 2000s and many traditional 
newsmedia outlets fell prey to consolidation, including the venerable progressive 
newspaper of Fighting Bob La Follette and William T. Evjue, The Capital Times, 
which was compelled to move to a weekly newsprint format. 
While labor unions, family farmers, students and independent media came 
out of this period somewhat weakened in organizational capacity, there were other 
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sectors where significant organizational and membership gains were made. New 
organizing by Hmong and Latino activists resulted in the formation of new 
community organizations and workers centers throughout the state. These 
institutional gains were particularly important given efforts by the Bradley 
Foundation to divide and conquer communities of color in Wisconsin through a 
racialized assault on public schools and social welfare programs. The cooperative 
and independent business sectors grew at a significant rate throughout the 1990s in 
particular, and by 2010, Wisconsin cooperatives such as Organic Valley and Union 
Cab of Madison were playing national leadership roles in advocacy groups like the 
Organic Consumers Association and the U.S. Federation of Worker Coops. A new 
type of social movement organization type emerged – democracy movement 
organizations. In the case of Wisconsin, these included the statewide Democracy 
Unlimited of Wisconsin Cooperative and the Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, as 
well as the national Liberty Tree Foundation for the Democratic Revolution and the 
Center for Media and Democracy. These new formations gained thousands of 
members in Wisconsin and engaged in significant popular education campaigns, 
teaching about corporate power, corporate harms, and the history of corporate 
personhood through publications, tabling at county fairs, and the collection of 
180,000 signatures on petitions calling for the revocation of Exxon, Pepsico, and 
Monsanto’s certificates of authority to do business in the state. 
In the electoral arena, the shape of progressive politics changed substantially. 
Beginning in the late 1980s and becoming well established by early 2000s, a 
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significant array of activists joined efforts to build independent political parties in 
Wisconsin, beginning with the Labor Farm Party of the 1980s and the New 
Progressive Party of the 1990s, and continuing on via the Wisconsin Green Party 
from the 1980s through the current day. Greens and Progressives held leadership 
positions on city councils, school boards and county boards in Madison, 
Milwaukee, Stevens Point, Oshkosh, Racine, and Superior, as well as seats in many 
others part of the state. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party of Wisconsin entered 
period of ideological dissonance in which most of the party base and many of its 
elected officials (such as Russ Feingold, Tammy Baldwin, Gwen Moore and Mark 
Pocan) remained significantly to the left of the national, Clintonized Democratic 
Party, even while the state party organization weakened substantially and came to 
be dominated by a business-oriented leadership cohort that frequently was 
involved in conflict with communities of color and particularly the organized Black 
left of Milwaukee.  
The overall trajectory of Wisconsin’s progressive movement in the 1990s and 
2000s produced organizations, unions, and networks that were generally less 
resourced by traditional measures of mobilization capacity but endowed with greater 
strategic capacity to do more with less and to do it more militantly and in 
cooperation with broader sectors of the population. Core pillars of the traditional 
progressive movement – labor unions, farm organizations, student associations, 
and Black community organizations – all came under direct and indirect attacks, 
and they suffered for it. And individuals experienced personal problems of 
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burnout, instability, and lack of time caused by austerity and structural adjustment; 
it became harder to be an activist. Activists recognized these issues and others, and 
attempted to redirect their movement building efforts accordingly, developing 
more horizontal, democratic, and diversified approaches to uniting disparate 
sectors of Wisconsin’s working classes in common struggle against common targets. 
 
B. The Wisconsin Wave 
   "The Wisconsin Uprising was not organized by a bunch of consultants based 
in D.C. - it came out of a history of organizing that was there bubbling under the 
surface that was ready to reemerge when push came to shove, and that's why this 
happened so well. People already had those experiences and those tools in the toolbox 
and could use them again when needed." (Peck 2016) 
 
When Scott Walker defeated Tom Barrett in the gubernatorial election of 
November 2, 2010, Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce (WMC) won an 
important victory. But mass popular resistance to WMC’s agenda could still be 
expected. The reasons for this should be clear. Since 1995, diverse activists had 
regularly targeted WMC and in the process, “unified due to a common enemy” 
(Peck). In times of operational unity, activists built personal relationships, new 
forms of social movement organization, and new networks across social sectors and 
across the state. Through these networks and in their practice of common struggle, 
activists developed a collective action repertoire which included regular 
occupations of the state capitol building, revival of the strike tradition, and notably, 
biennial alliances around the state budget.  
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Importantly, many Wisconsinites came to understand local troubles as part 
of global problems and made efforts to maintain relationships with activists and 
organizations on other continents. And alongside their transnational politics, 
Wisconsin activists consciously made use of the state’s deeply rooted progressive 
identity, such that for many, “The Wisconsin Uprising came from a gut sense 
understanding of what Wisconsinites were: progressive, socialist folk who 
understood that everyone deserved to be treated well.” (Nayak 2016) 
In his time as Milwaukee County Executive, Walker had not treated 
everyone well. He had targeted the poor, labor unions, public schools, and social 
services, and demonstrated a ruthlessness then-uncommon in Wisconsin’s political 
culture. The expectation among progressive activists was that Walker would prove 
a more aggressive proponent of austerity than previous governors Jim Doyle, Scott 
McCallum and Tommy Thompson. Even before taking office, Walker proved that 
expectation justified by thwarting nearly $1 billion in federal funding for the 
expansion of high speed rail to Wisconsin, something the Amtrak-loving Thompson 
would never have done. 
In the same election that produced Governor Walker, I was a Green Party 
candidate for election to the State Assembly on Madison’s west side. Convinced 
that a major austerity fight was coming, I entered the race in order to confront a 
perceived threat from within the Democratic Party in the form of a former Sierra 
Club staffer-turned-coal industry lobbyist, Brett Hulsey. I worried that Hulsey 
would, on taking office, undermine the progressive leadership of the Democratic 
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caucus in the state legislature. My platform included constitutional guarantees of 
full funding of public services and public education, taxing the rich, and expanding 
worker and community cooperatives.  
In a four-way race, I came in second with 31% of the vote, the highest 
percentage for any independent candidate in state-level elections in Wisconsin since 
1944. More significantly, after three major unions broke with the Democrats to 
endorse me –the teachers (MTI), the firefighters (IAFF 311) and the teaching 
assistants (TAA AFT 3220)– prominent Democrats also shifted allegiance. The 
Mayor of Madison, the President of Shorewood Hills, the former Attorney General, 
the current Secretary of State, and the future Congressman from the 2nd 
Congressional District, among others, all crossed party lines. The day before the 
election, the outgoing incumbent endorsed me. For my candidacy, this was all too 
little too late, but for the coming uprising, it proved significant.  
The day after that election, several teachers who were members of my 
campaign team came to me and asked me to make use of my lists, networks, and 
momentum to build a resistance to Scott Walker. As one of them put it, “we can’t 
trust the Democrats to do this for us, and people will be looking for leadership.”  
One month after the election, the Liberty Tree Foundation convened a 
teleconference briefing on the global response to austerity. Sixty Wisconsin activists 
joined with fifty others from around the United States in phoning in to talk directly 
with activists from the anti-austerity movement UK Uncut, the International 
Student Movement (ISM), the student struggle in Chile, and the globally renowned 
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Filipino intellectual, Walden Bello. One immediate result of the teleconference was 
the drafting of a confidential proposal for a “Wisconsin Wave of Action” circulated 
among movement leaders from different social sectors, borrowing much of its 
framework from the anti-austerity struggles in Europe, including the French slogan 
“We won’t pay for their crisis!,” and the concept of a “wave of action” from the 
Anomalous Wave of Italy as well as the 2010 Global Wave of Action to Defend 
Public Education:  
 
    “The Wisconsin Wave is a popular wave of resistance against planned cuts to 
public services to be imposed at the bidding of WMC and other corporate lobbyists. 
Its purpose is to directly name and confront the corporate interests behind the anti-
public sector agenda, weaken them politically, and as a result, shift the momentum 
from austerity and cuts, toward a demand for higher taxes on the rich, full funding 
for public services, and democratic reform of state government.” (Wisconsin Wave 
2010). 
 
The goals of the proposed Wave included “building a popular movement,” 
“reintroducing mass direct action to Wisconsin politics,” and “destroying the ability 
of WMC to function politically” (Ibid). The plan was to escalate the protests until 
May 1st, when a hoped-for crowd of 50,000 would enter and occupy the State 
Capitol Building. Other events would take place along the way, including actions at 
the annual state lobby day of Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce on February 
23, 2011.  
A first protest was scheduled for Valentine’s Day, February 14, 2011, by AFT 
locals 3220 and 223 as well as the Student Labor Action Coalition at the UW-
Madison and the student senate at Madison Area Technical College. Its theme was 
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the lighthearted but heartfelt message from the university community to “Please 
don’t break my heart, Governor Walker.” 
 
C. The Wisconsin Uprising 
On Friday morning, February 11th, 2011, Scott Walker “dropped the bomb,” 
as he himself put it, on Wisconsin’s working class by introducing what he called the 
“Budget Repair Bill,” also known as Act 10 – a comprehensive attack not only on 
public sector unions but also against state aid to the poor and disabled, the public 
university and college systems, libraries, parks, the progressive regulatory regime, 
microbreweries, cooperatives, renewable energy, and much more. While the 
preemptive timing of Walker’s blitzkrieg was unexpected, the assault itself was not. 
Within hours, small groups of people were picketing the Governor’s Mansion. On 
Monday, February 14th, students and campus workers stormed the Capitol, and the 
call for the Wisconsin Wave – signed by 100 union presidents, elected officials, and 
community, farm and student leaders – was made public: 
    “Today, Wisconsin’s democratic tradition faces the greatest threat it has ever 
known. Governor Scott Walker, operating at the direction of Wisconsin 
Manufacturers and Commerce (WMC), is using the financial crisis caused by Wall 
Street speculators as an excuse to impose devastating cuts to public services. The 
WMC agenda is shameless. They intend to shift the tax burden even further away 
from major corporations and onto the rest of us. Their agenda is undemocratic. They 
would protect themselves from voters by lowering Wisconsin’s voting rights 
guarantees to those of Alabama and Mississippi. Their agenda is heartless. It has no 
place in it for the needs of Wisconsin’s youth, our poor, our disabled, or our 
unemployed at this time when their needs are greatest.  
   The WMC‐Walker agenda would destroy everything that once made Wisconsin 
great: a robust educational system; safe, high paying jobs; and a clean environment 
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available for enjoyment by all people. But as in other grim times throughout our 
state’s history, concerned Wisconsinites are rising up to defend our way of life. This 
diverse group of individuals, which includes everyone from college students to 
factory workers to small farmers and businesspeople, is uniting behind the common‐
sense principle that the wealthy few who caused the financial crisis are the ones who 
should pay for it. This rising Wisconsin Wave of protest insists that: 
● Our state government must guarantee a fully funded public sector including 
education, health care, human services, transportation, public safety, and 
vital regulatory agencies. 
● Taxes on large corporations and wealthy individuals should be returned to 
reasonable levels in order to solve the state’s fiscal crisis. 
● The state must respect the rights of workers to organize unions and bargain 
collectively. 
● Initial budget priorities must be established through public participation 
instead of closed door meetings between public officials and special interest 
lobbyists. 
● Voting rights must be expanded, not limited, to insure that every 
Wisconsinite can take part in our democracy. 
● Wisconsin deserves government of, by, and for the people, not the corporate 
elite; corporations have no constitutional rights and may not buy our 
elections or government. 
   This Wisconsin Wave is a force independent of political parties and partisan 
elected officials. It is an awakening of Wisconsinites independent of –but not 
exclusive of– whatever other political, union, faith, or organizational affiliations we 
each might have. To the giant corporate interests that currently dominate our state, 
we say that we will not stand by and watch you destroy Wisconsin’s democracy, 
Wisconsin’s economy, Wisconsin’s schools, and Wisconsin’s communities. We will 
not pay for your crisis. We will organize. We will march. We will non‐violently 
resist your policies and overcome your agenda. To our fellow Wisconsinites we say 
simply, “join us.” Join the Wisconsin Wave of resistance against corporatization and 
austerity, and for democracy and shared prosperity for all.”    
~ from the Call for a Wisconsin Wave, 2/14/2011 
 
The Wisconsin protest wave escalated very quickly, growing by tens of 
thousands in days. Three unions –MTI (teachers), IAFF 311 (firefighters), and TAA 
(teaching assistants)– mobilized nearly their entire memberships to join students 
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and community members at the Capitol. Madison area schools were closed as 
thousands of area high school students marched downtown to join the fray. The big 
three statewide public sector unions –AFSCME, SEIU, WEAC– mobilized their 
members, and private sector unions began to add their numbers. Thousands 
occupied the Capitol and quickly self-organized management of the building. 
Within weeks the rallies in Madison had grown to 50,000, then 70,000, and 
eventually, 150,000+ people – this in a city of 225,000 people.  The protest wave had 
become something bigger: a popular uprising. 
 The South Central Federation of Labor in southern Wisconsin unanimously 
adopted a general strike resolution, and industrial action in the form of a political 
strike became a reality in the sectors of education, health, and transportation. State 
Senate Democrats fled the Capitol and the state in order to deny the legislature 
quorum. Across every rural and urban region of the state, activists organized mass 
protests in the thousands, public school students walked out of classes and 
occupied administration buildings, chamber of commerce offices faced pickets, 
corporate lobbyists were picketed at their homes, and workers walked off the job. 
“Madison was sort of a beating heart; things would circulate in and out,” from all 
the small towns and cities into the Capitol Square and back out again (Peck).  
Far from only a union movement, most sectors of Wisconsin’s working 
classes were involved, with farmers, students, unemployed and working poor 
acting and organizing together in the same way that Luxemburg meant when she 
wrote that, “Not above, among the heads of the leading directing organizations and 
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in their federative alliance, but below, among the organized proletarian masses, lies 
the guarantee of the real unity of the labor movement.” (Ibid p180). Cooperatives 
and local businesses self-organized to bring supplies and funding to the struggle, 
and began challenge WMC’s claim to speak on behalf of business interests. The 
Wisconsin National Guard, local police, even employees of the FBI not only refused 
to clear the Capitol Square, they took part in the protests.  Eventually, nearly 1 
million Wisconsin voters signed a petition to recall Governor Walker; 900,000 
signatures were certified by the state elections agency.  
Thousands came to Wisconsin from around the world and then went back 
home. Mass solidarity actions took place across the United States and around the 
world, and aid came in from Cairo, the UK, Korea, and elsewhere. Similar mass 
uprisings began to take place in other states of the industrial Midwest, and plans 
were made for mass encampments at Freedom Plaza in Washington D.C. and 
Zucotti Park in New York City. The horizontalist practices of the 1990s and the 
slogan of Seattle – This is What Democracy Looks Like! – reappeared as if resurrected 
in the echoing rotunda of Wisconsin’s Capitol, and from there was projected 
around the world, resonating to this day in Black Lives Matter and the Million 
Student March. And even at the height of the protests, organizing carried forward 
on parallel fronts, for instance, with the collection of 22,000 signatures to place a 
ballot measure before the voters of Madison calling for a constitutional amendment 
abolishing corporate constitutional rights and asserting popular sovereignty over 
  - 46 - 
campaign finance, the first of over 600 and states communities in the United States 
to have so far adopted such a measure.  
What you’ve read here is only a flashing reflection of the enormity and 
dynamism of the Wisconsin Uprising. And contrary to common misconceptions, 
the mass mobilizations that began in early 2011 lasted nearly two years, not just a 
few months. Yet I don’t intend and never intended to present here a blow by blow 
account of the Wisconsin Uprising or of the longer term protest wave. Instead, I 
have attempted to establish a baseline understanding of the movement building 
process that led up to the Uprising, and to make clear that while the mass protests 
were precipitated by Governor Walker’s actions, his actions were expected and 
planned for. The Uprising was not spontaneous. It was prefigured in the movement 
building and the social struggle of 20 years. And much of the way in which the 
Uprising carried forth could be expected given a serious analysis of the relation of 
the developing popular movement to the forces arrayed against it. So let’s turn to 
what did and did not happen in the course of the Uprising, and in the rebounding 
of the mass wave it heralded, and ask how the movement building process shaped 
these events . . .  
How did the Uprising escalate so quickly? Through activists mobilizing their 
personal networks and organizational members according to prepared plans and 
deeply embedded practices. “We had institutions that came out of our past work - 
coops, community radio, people who had medical, food not bombs skills, we had a 
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mini-temporary autonomous zone in the Capitol because of that - very quickly - 
people from outside were shocked.” (Peck).  
Why were the Madison area’s teaching assistants (TAA), teachers (MTI), and 
firefighter (IAFF 311) locals the labor movement’s first responders? Because MTI and the 
TAA had long provided much of the militant, democratic base of mainstream labor 
in southern Wisconsin, and the teachers and firefighters local 311 had a deeply 
intertwined history of mutual aid, and because all three unions had signaled that 
they were prepared to act unilaterally and without permission from the Democratic 
Party in the previous election cycle.  
Why were students, union families, farmers, and members of cooperative and 
environmental organizations the mainstays of the Uprising? Because those five 
constituencies shared a common culture of resistance, having regularly worked 
together for two decades in coalition around budget conflicts and in various anti-
corporate and pro-democracy campaigns.   
Why did so many individuals apparently unaffiliated with unions or with 
progressive organizations turn out? Because Wisconsinites’ collective identification 
with Wisconsin as a heartland of progressive politics and open government 
provided a quasi-nationalist basis for popular mobilization. 
Why did fourteen Democratic state senators choose to delay Act 10’s enactment by 
fleeing the state? And why did Secretary of State La Follette delay Act 10 further by 
refusing to publish the legislation? Because a critical section of the state Democratic 
Party’s elected officials were more aligned with popular movements than with state 
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party officials or the White House, both of which sought to end the occupation of 
the Capitol as soon as possible.  
How was it that the rhetoric and tactics of the Wisconsin Uprising spilled over 
regionally, nationally, and globally? They didn’t spill over. The Wisconsin Wave was 
produced by a movement in struggle both locally and globally. The Wave was 
initiated in direct communication with activists around the United States and across 
the world. As the Wave became an uprising, plans use Wisconsin to initiate a 
national “USA Wave” were shelved in favor of direct affiliation with the new U.S. 
Uncut anti-bank movement modeled on UK Uncut. People everywhere consciously 
worked to use Wisconsin to raise up the global anti-austerity, pro-democracy 
struggle within the rest of the United States. 
These answers are all variations on a theme. Movement building shaped and 
made possible the protest wave that rose up in Wisconsin in 2011. And where the 
Wisconsin Uprising can be said to have been most successful, it was in its 
movement building effects beyond the frozen streets of Wisconsin:   
 
   “I don’t think that the Uprising was a failure at all. Yes, maybe we didn’t get 
an immediate response. But we did build a level of consciousness and activism in 
people who had not been active before and who remain active and conscious now. We 
did inspire Occupy Wall Street in many ways. We did offer an example to other 
states out of what Wisconsin was doing.” (Stockwell) 
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D. Framework: Movements in Struggle 
The Wisconsin Wave was built by activists, and in turn, produced activists 
and made history. But measured against the bold metrics publicized by the 
initiators of the protests, the Uprising was only a partial success. True, Wisconsin 
built a class-based popular movement and it returned the practice of mass direct 
action to the national stage. But the movement’s most immediate goals were not 
met. WMC and other corporate lobbyists still write the bills that Wisconsin’s 
legislature enacts. And over the past five years, that legislation has profoundly 
harmed working class Wisconsinites.  
There were a few policy wins: attempts to break the UW-Madison off from 
the rest of the University of Wisconsin system were stopped, and an insurgent 
defense of microbreweries was successful. But the attack on public sector collective 
bargaining is now law, and Wisconsin is a Right-to-Work state. Where union 
representation declined from 19% to 14% of Wisconsin workers from 2000 to 2010, 
today only 8% of Wisconsin workers are represented by unions (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics). Wisconsin’s environmental, consumer and worker protection 
regulatory regimes have been gutted. Over 100 preemption laws have been enacted 
to prevent local governments from exceeding state standards. Well over a billion 
dollars in funding for public schools and colleges has been eliminated, and schools, 
libraries, and community centers have been shut down across the state. Hundreds 
of thousands of Wisconsinites have suffered severe cuts in food, health, family 
planning, and housing aid (WDC 2016).    
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How was it that some of the largest, most militant protests in American 
history failed to accomplish their most immediate goals? The facial answer is that 
the occupation ended, the protests deescalated, and the state government went 
ahead and implemented nearly all of its agenda. The deeper answer is that the 
preparations that were made in the years leading up to 2010 were sufficient to build 
the kind of explosive popular movement that inspired the world, but insufficient to 
defeat a state government under the control of committed ideologues. The 
Republican legislature, after all, is the product of the most gerrymandered 
legislative districts in the United States (Jackman 2015). The GOP handily lost the 
popular vote in both 2012 and 2014, yet retained a 20% majority in both legislative 
chambers. The militant majority movement from below that built the Wisconsin 
Uprising came into a conflict with a militant minority movement from above, and 
lost. 
I have posited that movement building occurs in the course of struggle – that 
it is an interactive and intra-active process undertaken on particular terrains of 
struggle in the light and under the shadow of other actors (see Figure 1, below). 
Activists engaged in struggle produce identifiable social movement elements that in 
turn make possible and shape the conflicts of the future. The timing and the 
outcomes of those conflicts are, like movement building, codetermined by the 
extant conditions of particular terrains of struggle and the actions of other actors, 
including especially movements from above. Theoretically, an activist with perfect 
information about the terrains on which they were operating and about the culture, 
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continuity structures, leadership and resource capacity of other actors in struggle 
could make decisions that result in total movement success. In practice, activists 
never have perfect information, they never are capable of considering all the angles, 
and they operate with many motivations and understandings that are not 
instrumentally tied to movement success. Yet most social movement activists “try 
to get it right” by developing strategies for success, and in their strategic praxis they 
engage in movement building.  
 
 
Figure 1: A model of movements in struggle 
 
Relation of conflicts and waves to periods of struggle: 
 
Periods of Struggle > Waves of Contention > Conflicts 
  
The movement building process: 
 
Activists in Struggle → Interactional + Intra-actional Movement Building → 
Elements of Social Movements → Condition of Movement at Time “x” 
 
 Production of conflicts and waves of contention: 
 
Condition of Movement at the Time “x” + Condition of Movements from Above + 
Condition of Terrain of Struggle → Conflicts/Waves of Contention 
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E. What Might Have Been Done? 
 What might have been done that would have resulted in the defeat of Act 10 
and the WMC’s agenda? My research suggests three related factors undermined the 
success of the Wisconsin Wave: de-escalation, overly solidaristic politics, and 
ineffectively-answered racism.  
Escalation made the Wisconsin Wave what it was; de-escalation ended it. 
There were other possible ends to the protest wave. It could have been smashed, 
with mass arrests and police violence; it wasn’t. It could have resulted in the defeat 
of Walker and WMC; it didn’t. The Wisconsin Uprising of early 2011, as well as the 
Wisconsin Wave of 2010-2012, ended instead through de-escalation.  
Hundreds of thousands rallied behind demands for full funding for public 
services; AFSCME leader Marty Beil unilaterally offered health care, pension, and 
other concessions to Walker. As AFSCME’s Ed Sadlowski, Jr. put it, “The state 
leadership were giving away all of our leverage and offering up concessions instead 
of making demands." Beil’s announcement of concessions was met with 
spontaneous booing by the masses gathered at the Capitol, but the damage was 
done. Meanwhile, national union leadership pressured local union leaders to drop 
the general strike resolution, and they did. With no obvious way left to escalate 
from the seizure of the Capitol, the stage was set for an end to the occupation. 
Jennifer Epps-Addison relates that: 
   “I think we could all could agree that there was a really large disconnect 
between the activists on the ground who made the world stop around this and the 
gatekeepers who were negotiating away our position even at a time when we were in 
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a position of power. While the people who were occupying were calling for a general 
strike they were giving away all of our leverage.”  
 
De-escalation took place within the Democratic Party as well. The State 
Senate Democrats who had fled Wisconsin were unable to maintain their solidarity 
as a number of them began to get cold feet. They returned to Madison and were 
welcomed as heroes. With quorum restored, Act 10 was adopted.  
A grassroots movement for the recall of Scott Walker and other Republican 
officials collected one million signatures. In turn, the national and state Democratic 
Parties did everything in their power to insure that no candidate associated with 
the Uprising emerged to challenge Walker. Prominent progressives like State 
Senator Erpenbach, State Assembly Minority Leader Barca, and former U.S. Senator 
Russ Feingold were pressured by national Democrats not to run. Even Dane County 
Executive Kathy Falk, hardly a stalwart of the progressive wing of the Democratic 
Party, was attacked by party officials for pledging that she would overturn Act 10 if 
elected. Instead, Walker again faced the man he had defeated in the previous 
election, Tom Barrett. Barrett distanced himself from organized labor and reiterated 
his support for ending school board control of the Milwaukee schools. “The realm 
of politics was reduced once again to the ballot box,” (Peck) and, “the people relied 
on to do the legwork for campaigns were treated badly – candidates were forced on 
them – and so the mass movement was not engaged as it should have been.” (Epps-
Addison). Barrett, and the movement, lost. 
  - 54 - 
The answer to why de-escalation occurred depends on who is asked the 
question. As Norman Stockwell observes, “In any kind of real people's movement, 
you will always have people coming together, many of whom may not have 
worked together and may have to learn how to talk to each other and may or may 
not have respect for each other.” Those who pushed for de-escalation at the time 
said that the movement did not have the resources to mobilize a general strike, to 
maintain the occupation of the Capitol, or to defeat Scott Walker with a progressive 
gubernatorial candidate. Nearly all of those who initiated the Wisconsin Wave and 
played leading roles in expanding the Uprising disagreed, saying in various ways 
that the moderate forces, “didn't have a grasp of what they had in their hands at the 
time." (Sadlowski). How this disagreement was resolved proved pivotal to the 
outcome of the protests.  
Early on in the Uprising, the leaders of the big statewide unions that favored 
de-escalation formed what they called “The Labor Table,” and began meeting 
regularly at the Concourse Hotel a block from the Capitol. Those participating in 
these meetings included some “who couldn't even stand being in the same room 
together before then,” but “the locals who were the power behind any kind of 
demonstration were excluded.” (Matthews). The three unions –MTI, IAFF 311, and 
the TAA– which had led the occupation of the Capitol were excluded. So too were 
the other local unions and student, environmental, and community organizations 
that were part of the initial Wisconsin Wave call to action, as well as newer popular 
organizations such as the Kill the Bill Coalition, Wisconsin Resists!, and 
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Autonomous Solidarity Organization, formed in the course of the Uprising. 
Without exception, those who met at the Concourse Hotel favored de-escalation 
and “no arrests!” as opposed to “fill the jails!” (Sadlowski). There was also a national 
business unionism versus local militant unionism dynamic that emerged, familiar to 
many who had taken part in the labor wars of the Upper Great Lakes of the 1990s. 
Why did de-escalation win out? After all, the militants had initiated both the 
Wisconsin Wave and the Wisconsin Uprising, they had the great majority of active 
protest participants on their side, and they had longstanding experience working 
together through budget mobilizations, strikes, and various anti-corporate 
campaigns. The section in favor of escalation should have been well situated to 
provide overall leadership.  
My analysis of the dynamics between the two groups led me in an 
unexpected direction. I conclude that at the time of the Uprising, the militants were 
too solidaristic. Despite a history of internal struggle between different sections of the 
labor movement and between rank-and-filers and officers, “people said ‘let bygones 
be bygones, we need to rally around this and move forward.’” (Peck). With no 
exceptions that I can identify, those who took part in more militant actions 
displayed a level of solidarity with more conservative elements that is unusual in 
the history of the American left. And it must be acknowledged that this full 
spectrum solidarity, from anarchists and Trotskyists to conservative Democrats and 
a few old-time Republicans, provided many advantages in the course of the 
Uprising. For instance, when Senate Democrats were trying to escape arrest so that 
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they could flee the state, cadre activists of the International Socialists, Socialist 
Alternative, and Solidarity mobilized to protect them. And when the Capitol 
occupation moved outside to form Walkerville –a tent city on the Capitol Square that 
directly inspired a similar encampment in Albany, NY, and in turn, Occupy Wall 
Street– the Concourse Hotel unions, led by AFSCME, provided material support. 
Yet one outcome of Wisconsin’s solidaristic politics was that there was no effective 
means to counter de-escalation pressure from above and no way to compel the 
Democratic Party to run a movement-aligned candidate who could prevail in the 
recall election. The fetishization of solidarity had its consequences. 
Issues of solidarity also form the third factor my analysis finds to have been 
consequential in the Wisconsin Uprising. In this case, the problem was the failure to 
build sufficient solidarity in the face of the racist divide-and-conquer strategy of the 
organized right: 
“Looking at the history of Wisconsin and having grown up there my whole life, I 
was very clear that what many politicians do is to seed fear and distrust of people of 
color, of Black folks, of immigrants, of Milwaukee as a place … They use that in 
order to maintain their power, in order to get folks who should be naturally aligned 
through core value and core public policy desires to fight with each other and stay 
separated. It’s like Scott Walker said during the Uprising, ‘the strategy here is divide 
and conquer,’ and that’s been the strategy going all the way back to slavery when it 
was made illegal for indentured servants and slaves to till the same fields.”   
      (Epps-Addison) 
 
Epps-Addison articulates the understanding shared by many Wisconsin 
activists I’ve spoken and worked with, often people who identity as multiracial or 
who come from multiracial families, or who for other reasons occupy transliminal 
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social positions. This shared analysis informed the conscious efforts of activists in 
the 1990s and 2000s to build on a multiracial and a statewide basis in respond to 
corporatization and austerity pushes from above that had the effect of “lowering 
the floor so much that people who don't have much would otherwise be turned 
against each other,” as Sangita Nayak put it.  
But the people who were involved in those conscious anti-racist, rural-urban, 
and statewide efforts were not the same people included at the Labor Table at the 
Concourse Hotel. There resulted a “distinct missing presence of people of color who 
were engaged in that fight and welcomed into that fight” (Epps-Addison) and 
organizations such as Freedom, Inc, based in Madison’s Hmong community, found 
it necessary to repeatedly make clear that the attack on public sector unions was 
only one part of a march larger attack on poor and working class Wisconsinites, 
disproportionately people of color. The first mass rally that included large numbers 
of people of color (as well as farmers, students, and women) on stage was the 50,000 
strong March 5th “We Are Wisconsin!” rally organized through the Wisconsin Wave 
(not to be confused with the We Are Wisconsin organization created by the 
Democratic Party of Wisconsin a week later as a moderating alternative to the 
Wave). But “the big money fightback,” funded through the big statewide and 
national union organizations, “was not messaging or targeted to communities of 
color.” (Epps-Addison). 
 It’s not clear that the failure of major actors to affirmatively build on a 
multiracial basis had an immediate negative impact on the effectiveness of the mass 
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protests at the Capitol and around the state. In the critical Wisconsin Supreme 
Court election of April 5, 2011, however, the long-term failure to effectively support 
organizing in majority minority Milwaukee became plain. In a contest decided by 
the “discovery” of a net 7500 votes for Walker by conservative Waukesha County 
Clerk one day after the election, an increase of voter turnout in the City of 
Milwaukee of just 3% of eligible voters would have changed history. The election 
was between incumbent David Prosser, a Walker ally, and JoAnne Kloppenburg, a 
progressive lawyer whom the WMC attacked in its mailings as having “strong ties 
to Wisconsin's extreme left, including endorsement by the former national co-
chairman of the radical Green Party, Ben Manski.” Kloppenburg would have been a 
very different jurist than Prosser (who had recently made headlines for assaulting 
another justice), but more important in that election was that the balance of the 
Supreme Court was in play, and the court was to prove the final arbiter on Act 10, 
Right to Work, voting rights questions, and much else in the years to follow.  
Why had the major organizations and funders “not done the work” previous 
to 2011? Epps-Addison exp0lains it this way: “Because [before 2011] the Dems were 
in power, involved in an unholy alliance with WMC – think about [Gov.] Jim Doyle, 
he's a reason we got preemption of the municipal minimum wage … when 
[neoliberal Democrat] James Norquist is your mayor, there isn't an interest in Black 
voter turnout in Milwaukee.” The racialized corporatization politics of the 1990s 
and 2000s had been opposed by some Democrats, but embraced by others, 
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including Walker’s two-time Democratic opponent, Tom Barrett, who as mayor had 
repeatedly attempted to end local school board oversight of the Milwaukee schools. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
’Tis the final battle, 
Let each stand in their place. 
The international working class,  
Shall be the human race. 
~ The Internationale, as sung in Madison, Wisconsin since the 1970s 
 
 There may be more people who know all the words to multiple versions of 
the revolutionary anthem The Internationale in Madison, Wisconsin than in any 
other city in the United States. It is sung on May Day, and sung on Labor Day, and 
sung in protest at the Solidarity Sing-along that still takes place nearly every day to 
this day at Wisconsin’s Capitol. But the experience of the Wisconsin Uprising raises 
the question of whether, in fact, those who took part in it understood that the 
current period of struggle might indeed be “the final battle,” as the anthem 
declares. 
For many in Wisconsin, “the Uprising was about how we treat our own 
people” (Nayak) and returning to the pre-Reagan working class Happy Days 
symbolized by Milwaukeean Henry Winkler. But a return to those days was not in 
the offing because, beginning with the global crash of capitalism in 2008, the 
struggle that had begun in the 1990s had entered a heightened phase. Few if any 
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activists fully understood that. As Sarah Manski, my wife and a veteran of 
Wisconsin’s labor movements since her teenage years in 1990s Janesville, relates: 
“We didn’t think we were going to lose, because we did the same things we’d done 
in the past when we didn’t lose. We were dealing with a state that didn’t care about 
legitimacy; in that kind of situation, you lose when you base your tactics on a battle 
for legitimacy.” (Manski 2016). 
The collective action repertoire developed in the 1990s had worked until that 
point, but the movement from above, operating through Walker and the Republican 
legislature, had developed a counter-repertoire grounded in a policy of total war. 
As John Peck put it, "You might organize a little rally, and that's nice in your little 
town, but when you have actors like Walker and WMC you might as well be 
roadkill; the only way to respond is expressions of power.”  
Movement building matters. In the case of Wisconsin, movement building 
produced a historic uprising and inspired others. But there are times when 
struggles go from conflicts to waves and then in which, to win, they must become 
more than waves. For Wisconsinites to prevail, they needed a movement that could 
escalate beyond industrial strikes, mass occupations, enormous rallies, statewide 
mobilization, the shutdown of state government, support from the police, and one 
million people signing recall petitions. They needed a revolutionary movement. 
The Wisconsin Wave had been prepared with an expectation that 50,000 
people could be mobilized to occupy the Capitol by May Day, and that that would 
make the difference. Instead, the occupation began on February 15th and swelled to 
150,000 within weeks.  
  - 61 - 
After the general strike movement was undermined and quorum restored to 
the State Senate, Wave organizers began convening popular assemblies in different 
parts of the state in an attempt to build a stronger and more cohesive base of 
independent, popular power. They also began conversations with mayors and other 
elected officials in various Wisconsin cities about setting up a confederation of 
municipalities as a provisional alternative to the Walker government. But the Wave 
and the other independent popular organizations were built on the 1990s 
horizontalist model, and did not possess the internal discipline to mobilize the 
resources of affiliated organizations and networks.  
“In my lifetime we had never, at least not in Wisconsin, seen the kind of 
passionate gut check ‘fight for your life’ organizing that emerged out of the Uprising. 
The Uprising complete changed people's imaginations of what was possible.” (Epps-
Addison) 
 
It is true that Wisconsin opened the doors to what was possible. It also gave 
a hard lesson as to what may be necessary in the years to come. 
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Appendix: Script for Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Wisconsin Protocol.1.1 – Democratic Turn 
 
In this study we are interested in learning from your history of organizing in Wisconsin 
in the 20 years leading up to the Wisconsin Uprising of 2011. We want to know how choices 
that activists made in those earlier years impacted the way in which the Wisconsin Uprising 
took place. 
 
We have a lot of ground to cover, so if you are able to give more focused responses, that 
would be helpful. This said, if you feel the need to expand on some of your answers, that’s 
fine. This interview should take about an hour. 
 
I. ORIGINS AND EXPERIENCES 
 
 1. Tell me a little about how you came to be involved in working for social change. 
 
 2. Go back to the years 1990-1995 . . . and thinking about the broader movement . . . 
how do you remember thinking - at that time - about what the shape of things to come was. 
Did you have a sense of what the “coming struggle” was going to be about? If so, what was 
that sense? 
 
 3. Thinking to the entire period of the 1990s and 2000s, please share what you 
learned from some of the most significant struggles that you were involved with in that time 
period. What were the lessons learned? 
 
II. MOVEMENT BUILDING 
 
 4. Activists often talk about “movement building.” What do you think it means to 
“build the movement?” 
 
5. Can you give me some examples of movement building activity that took place in 
Wisconsin in the 1990s and 2000s?  
 
 6. Let’s follow up.  
 
How do you believe that the lessons, skills, and ideas that were learned in the 
struggles of the 1990s and 2000s were passed on to new people who joined the 
movement in Wisconsin later on? Were any important lessons lost, and if so, why? 
 
How did you and others develop new leadership in the movement over the 
1990s and 2000s? How did you fail to develop new leadership? 
 
Thinking of movement veterans - how did you and others in Wisconsin stay 
in contact with each other over these many years? What caused people to lose 
contact? 
  - 76 - 
 
What was done to build resources - money, lists, organization, etc - in the 
1990s and 2000s? What limited access to resources over these years? 
 
III. WISCONSIN UPRISING 
 
7. Where did you operate during the Wisconsin Uprising, and what did you see your 
role as being in the Uprising? 
 
8. How do you think the previous 20 years of movement building shaped what 
happened in the uprising, for better and for worse? 
 
9. What wasn’t done in terms of movement building that should have been done? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
